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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
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This paper measures the extent to which firms in 
developing countries are the target of bribes. Using 
new firm-level survey data from 33 African and Latin 
American countries, we first show that perceptions 
adjust slowly to firms’ experience with corrupt officials 
and hence are an imperfect proxy for the true incidence 
of graft. We then construct an experience-based index 
that reflects the probability that a firm will be asked for 
a bribe in order to complete a specified set of business 
transactions. On average, African firms are three times 
This paper—a product of the Enterprise Analysis Unit, Financial and Private Sector Development Vice Presidency—is 
part of a larger effort to study and promote reforms in the business environment. Policy Research Working Papers are also 
posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The corresponding author may be contacted at jlopezcordova@ifc.org.
as likely to be asked for bribes as are firms in Latin 
America, although there is substantial variation within 
each region. Last, we show that graft appears to be 
more prevalent in countries with excessive regulation 
and where democracy is weak. In particular, our results 
suggest that the incidence of graft in Africa would fall by 
approximately 85 percent if countries in the region had 
levels of democracy and regulation similar to those that 
exist in Latin America. The Incidence of Graft on Developing-Country Firms  
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 Financial and Private Sector Development Vice-Presidency, World Bank Group. Email: agonzalez4@worldbank.org; 
jlopezcordova@ifc.org; and evalladares@worldbank.org.  1  Introduction 
Corruption is a serious burden for firms in the developing world. In 2006, two out of every five firms in 
Africa and Latin America reported that unofficial payments were required “to get things done,” and one 
in six said they were expected to present informal gifts when meeting with tax inspectors. On average, 
informal gifts or payments “to get things done” were equivalent to 2.1 percent of firm sales, which, taken 
at face value, would not appear to be excessive, especially in comparison with applicable tax rates around 
the world. Nevertheless, the uncertainty and illegal nature associated with corruption makes it more 
burdensome on firms than official taxation (Shleifer and Vishny 1993; Fisman and Svensson 2007). More 
worrisome is that the incidence of bribes is higher precisely in the poorest countries, where development 
needs are most pressing. For example, whereas 9 percent of firms in Chile believe informal gifts are 
required to “get things done,” 87 percent of firms in Burkina Faso are of that view. Similarly, two out of 
every three firms in Cameroon and the Democratic Republic of Congo state that they must pay bribes 
when meeting with tax officials. Finally, firms in Africa report having to pay higher bribes, as a percent 
of sales, than their counterparts in relatively-affluent Latin America, 2.7 vs. 1.4 percent, respectively.
2
Since growth is unlikely without a vibrant private sector, measuring and understanding how 
corruption affects firms is an important research area. However, efforts in that direction are thwarted by 
the lack of reliable information about the incidence of corruption. By its very nature, it is difficult to come 
by objective data on the pervasiveness of graft. Work on the subject often relies on perceptions on the 
extent of corruption, but there is evidence that perceptions are a poor reflection of the prevalence of 
corrupt practices (Olken 2007; Weber 2007).
3
 In addition, existing cross-country measures of corruption 
are often based on surveys of a limited number of experts, a non-representative sample of firms (e.g., 
multinational corporations), or households, and hence may not necessarily reflect the experience of the 
average enterprise. 
In this paper we exploit a novel dataset of nearly 10,000 firms in 33 countries in Latin America 
and Africa to compute objective measures of the incidence of corruption.
4
 The data come from the 
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 All figures come from the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys and are available at http://www.enterprisesurveys.org . 
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 Even the figures in the opening paragraph can be criticized for reflecting firms’ views on how widespread corruption and not 
necessarily their own experience. 
4
 Our sample consists of firms in 18 African and 15 Latin American countries. In Africa they include: Angola, Botswana, 
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Malawi, 
Mauritania, Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, Swaziland, Tanzania, and Uganda. In Latin America they are: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
  2 Enterprise Surveys collected by the World Bank that cover business conditions in most major economies 
across the globe. These surveys capture firm perceptions about the quality of the business environment, as 
well as objective information on firm characteristics and the problems firms must deal with when 
transacting with the public or private sector. These problems include delays or difficulties in gaining 
access to electricity or credit, the extent of obligations from complex taxes, and frequent inspections, 
among others. The Enterprise Surveys also contain information on firms’ perceptions about the problems 
that corruption poses for their performance, as well as records on whether firms were asked to make “an 
informal gift or payment” when requesting access to basic infrastructure services or government permits.
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The latter form the basis of the analysis in this paper.  
We first matched data on perceptions and on instances of bribery and show that firms that solicit 
services or licenses and are not asked for bribes hold a more optimistic view about the effect of corruption 
on firm performance, relative to both firms that are victims of extortion and those that did not request 
services and hence are beyond the reach of corrupt officials. We take this as evidence suggesting that 
perception-based measures of corruption are an imperfect proxy for the true incidence of graft.  
We then use the Enterprise Survey data to construct a Graft Index of Firm Transactions (GIFT). 
The index reflects the probability that a firm will be asked for an informal gift or bribe when requesting 
access to infrastructure services or permits. The proposed index has several advantages over alternative 
measures of corruption. Most notably, the index relies on “hard” data — firms’ encounters with corrupt 
practices — and not on managers’ or experts’ perceptions about the extent of corruption in a country. 
Another advantage is that our primary data come from nationally representative surveys and hence 
capture the experience of the typical firm’s dealing with dishonest government officials. The fact that we 
focus on a common set of transactions guarantees that our results are comparable across countries. 
Admittedly, the index is based on a narrow definition of graft that focuses on petty bribes and we do not 
directly account for several other forms of corruption (e.g., in the procurement of government contracts) 
that could potentially have a bigger effect on firm performance. 
The index strongly indicates that firms in Africa are particularly vulnerable to graft. 
Entrepreneurs in the region had on average a 19 percent chance of being asked for bribes; among the 
comparatively wealthier Latin American countries, the figure was only a third as high (7 percent). Within 
each of the two regions, and even among neighboring countries, there is substantial variation in the 
incidence of bribery, suggesting that corruption is not necessarily explained by cultural or historical 
factors. The index also shows that bribery is more common when requesting licenses and permits than 
when soliciting infrastructure services. 
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 Specifically, access to electricity, water, telephone services, construction permits, operating licenses, and import licenses. 
  3 Finally, we use the index to shed light on some of the factors that lie behind the incidence of 
graft.  In particular, we study whether excessive regulation is associated with corruption. For that we use 
data from the World Bank’s Doing Business project.
 
The latter ranks countries according to the extent and 
nature of the regulatory and legal obligations that firms have to meet to be able to operate in an economy; 
more obligations translate into a lower rank.
6
 We also consider whether democratic governments, more 
accountable to their citizenry, do a better job in containing petty bribery. We find that both excessive 
regulation and weak democracies increase the likelihood that firms will be the target of bribes. Our 
quantitative results imply that differences in the incidence of graft in Africa and Latin America would 
disappear if the former had levels of democracy and regulation similar to those that exist in the Western 
Hemisphere. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we address the relationship between 
experience with corruption and the perception of corruption. We show that perceptions adjust only 
gradually to changes in the true extent of graft. In Section 3, we explain how we calculate the Graft Index 
of Firm Transactions, apply the methodology to our sample of countries, and present our estimates. In 
Section 4, we look at some of the correlates of the index at the country level. Although the data do not 
allow us to identify the causes behind graft, findings here regarding the link between regulation, 
democracy, and corruption are in line with those suggested in the literature and explored by other authors. 
Section 5 concludes.  
2  Do perceptions of corruption match incidences of graft? 
In this section, we discuss the relationship between perceptions and incidences of corruption. We begin 
by discussing the difficulty with measuring the extent of corruption using perceptions data —which are at 
present almost exclusively what is used to measure corruption. By comparing firm-level data on the 
incidences of bribes with firm-level data on perceptions of corruption, we show that perceptions and 
incidences are imperfectly matched but likely to be updated depending on recent experience. With respect 
to updating of corruption perceptions, the data show that when firms have a positive experience with 
honest, uncorrupt officials, these same firms are prone to have more positive perceptions about the extent 
of corruption than firms that had no record of transactions with officials or those that had transactions and 
were asked for bribes to complete them. 
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  4 2.1  Why is corruption hard to measure and compare across countries? 
In order to assess the nature and extent of corruption, economists prefer transaction data —who 
businesses bribe, how much they bribe, how often they bribe, and what is gotten in return for those bribes. 
Given the illegal nature of these activities, such data are difficult to get. In their absence, many studies 
have had to settle for perceptions and opinions about corruption to determine its prevalence and nature 
(Lambsdorff 2006; Kaufmann et al 2007).  
While perceptions data are easier to get than direct reports of corrupt deals, using perceptions is 
problematic.  First, it is difficult to pin down how perceptions are formed because corruption refers to 
activities that are the hidden and largely unobservable. Therefore, perceptions about corruption are likely 
formed by what people believe to be generally taking place and less so on what is personally experienced. 
In any one city or country, what people believe to be taking place may start to converge since people read 
the same newspapers, are exposed to the same political rhetoric and may hear others’ opinions about 
corruption (Čábelková and Hanousek 2004; Moyal et al. 2004). In the end, people may end up repeating 
those personally unverified opinions until they become well-ingrained folklore (Andvig 2004).  
Second, it is not clear what type of corruption one is measuring when constructing a corruption 
index (Knack 2002, Weber 2007). Some indexes are based on experts’ assessments of overall corruption 
in a country. Most often, these experts are either managers of multinational firms operating in these 
countries or financial analysts who study the investment risk of several countries across the globe. 
Managers and financial analysts are unlikely to have specific personal experience with having to give 
petty bribes to get things done. It is also more likely that a CEO has personal experience with a different 
type of corruption, political corruption, for example, and may refer to that when asked about corruption. 
In sum, experts in one country may refer to political corruption and experts in another county may refer to 
the practice of doling out protection money to the local thugs to keep shipments safe and on time.  
Third, there is a contextual problem with perceptions as each respondent has his or her own point 
of reference and it is unlikely to be shared by many (Bertrand et al. 2001). It is possible that individuals 
do not share the same point of reference even when experiencing the same incident. For example, it is not 
clear that if a manager considers a country to be “very corrupt” another manager that works in other 
countries will share the same relative measure of what is “very corrupt.” Among many things, the 
personality or state of mind of the respondent may affect responses, some seeing the glass half empty and 
others half full. 
Most of these criticisms point out why there is likely to be a gap between perceptions of 
corruption and direct experience with it. Convincing as these arguments are, there is little direct evidence 
about the nature or size of this difference between perceptions and experience. Exploiting the perceptions 
  5 and the direct experience data contained in the Enterprise Surveys, we have the ability to explore the 
existence and nature of the gap between the two.  
2.2  Are perceptions correlated with the incidence of bribes? 
In likely response to the criticisms and limitations of perceptions data on corruption, there is a nascent 
empirical literature developing on the relationship between experience with corruption and perceptions of 
corruption.
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 Olken (2006) takes a detailed, micro approach and examines corruption perceptions and 
incidences of skimming off the top from road construction in Indonesia.  He finds that perceptions on the 
extent of corruption and objective levels are a good reflection of each other when the extent of corruption 
can be easily and objectively confirmed. However, when corruption is carried out in ways that are easily 
hidden and unverifiable, perceptions and the extent of corruption begin to diverge. Two country studies, 
one in Ukraine (Čábelková and Hanousek 2004) and one in Uruguay (Moyal et al. 2004), show that media 
sources are influential in forming perceptions of corruption and, most importantly, these studies show 
how negative perceptions of corruption may reinforce people’s willingness to offer bribes.  However, 
these two studies do not have data that tally direct experiences with bribing or other forms of corruption.  
While these micro studies show that it is difficult to disentangle the relationship between 
perception and experience, Tirole (1996) provides a theoretical model as to the dynamic nature of 
perceptions and experience and under what conditions perceptions and experience of corruption diverge. 
With respect to the dynamics, collective reputations are difficult to change.  With respect to their 
divergence, Tirole points out that the corrupt acts of others stick to all officials, even when there may be 
only a handful of corrupt officials. Furthermore, this collective reputation provides few incentives for 
even honest civil servants to maintain their integrity and remain incorruptible. In sum, both the nature of 
the dynamics and of the collective reputation of corruption requires many repeated acts of honesty from 
public officials to wipe out the perception that corruption is prevalent.  
Informed from what we know of the empirical and theoretical literature, we fill the gap of 
research on the nature and (possibly) its dynamics on the relationship between perception and experience 
with corruption. We do so by matching perceptions data on corruption to the transaction data to determine 
if perceptions differ when a firm is or is not a victim of graft and for the first time, to the best of our 
knowledge, determine the relationship between the two.  
For perceptions, we use data from cases where firms are asked to rank the top three obstacles, out 
of a list of sixteen, that affect the operations of the establishment. Answers from all entrepreneurs asked 
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 For a cross country examination of the relationship between perception of and experience with corruption, see Weber (2007). 
  6 this question is the left-hand side, dependent, variable. For the experience variable, the Enterprise Surveys 
contain information on whether businesses had to provide a bribe to complete any one of six different 
transactions: requests for an electrical connection, a water connection, telephone service, an import 
license, a construction-related permit, or an operating license.  
With this perceptions dependent variable and direct experience independent variable, we specify 
an econometric equation of the form: 















The dependent variable,  , is a binary variable that equals one if the firm ranked corruption as one of 
the top three obstacles and zero if it did not. The are two dummy variables,   and  , that represent 
firms that solicited a service or license and reported bribing or no bribing, respectively. These dummy 
variables of graft are the objective or experiential measure of corruption that is of interest here. The   
variable takes on a value of one when a firm solicited any of the services but no bribe was solicited or 
expected and zero otherwise. The   variable takes on a value of one when a service was solicited and a 
bribe was asked for or expected and zero otherwise. The omitted category is firms that did not solicit 
services or licenses. In estimating Equation 1, we include a matrix   of control variables. It includes 
country and industry fixed effects to account for the unobserved parameters at the country and industry 
levels. It also includes firm size and age, and a binary variable indicating whether the firm has 
experienced arson, robbery or theft in the last year, as another control variable. We include the latter 
variable since corruption and crime are often symptoms of governance systems that are not functioning 
well. We expect that crime and corruption go hand in hand and our econometric specification would 
suffer from omitted variable bias had we not included some control for some measure of the quality of 











ε ) is an error term that is potentially 
heteroskedastic and that may be correlated across all firms within each country. Therefore, we calculate 
robust standard errors and allow for clustering by country.  
Of interest are the signs of coefficients   and  . If the true extent of corruption were 
common knowledge to all firm, then we could reasonably expect to see no difference in the way in which 
firms perceive corruption (when   = 0 or   = 0), after controlling for observables, irrespective of 
whether they were bribed or not. In this situation, we would expect to see a very close relationship 









  7 imperfectly observed, firms will update their views on the problems posed by corruption based on their 
experience in dealing with corrupt officials. In particular, a firm that solicits a service or license and is not 
asked for a bribe will be more sanguine about the problems posed by corruption than firms that do not 
solicit any service or license (  < 0). Similarly, a firm that requests a service or license and is asked for 
a bribe will become more cynical than firms that do not make any requests (  > 0). A corollary of this 
is that firms that do not request any licenses services will adjust their views on corruption more gradually 





Table 1 presents Probit regression estimates of Equation 1. The results show that firms that 
undertake some transaction and are not victims of bribes are less likely to rank corruption as a top-three 
obstacle to enterprise performance (  < 0). These results hold among firms in both regions as well as 
for the pooled data and are independent of the size or age of the firm. 
nb
G β
One hypothesis consistent with this empirical finding is that there is updating taking place. Firms 
begin the transaction with a similar perception as to the severity of corruption that most other firms share. 
However, once firms complete a transaction in which they did not have to resort to bribing, they do not 
have their initial perceptions verified and, as a result, become more optimistic about the extent of 
corruption than their peers. This positive updating of perceptions on corruption is independent of the 
initial average level of corruption. In other words, even in countries, in this sample, that are relatively 
bribe-free, firm’s perceptions of corruption are on average improved when they are not asked for a bribe 
to complete their transaction.  
Regarding firms that are asked for bribes, we see that the relevant coefficient,  , has a positive 
sign but is not statistically different from zero. That is, updating does not seem to take place when a firm 
reports being asked for a bribe. For firms that were asked for a bribe to complete a transaction, their 
perception of the severity of corruption is statistically indistinguishable from the perception of firms that 
did not solicit any services. This indicates that there is inertia in perceptions about corruption. This inertia 




Taken together, the result that updating only takes place when firms complete transactions 
without having to bribe, coupled with the result that firms that had to resort to bribing are statistically 
indistinguishable from firms that did not deal with officials at all, tell us that perceptions are likely to lag 
objective measures on corruption in cases where the extent of corruption is in flux. For the aims of the 
present paper, the evidence herein supports the argument that perceptions-based measures of corruption 
are an imperfect proxy for the true incidence of graft. 
  8 3  Measuring the incidence of graft 
We have presented evidence showing that using perceptions about the severity of corruption is an 
inaccurate gauge of the true extent of corruption. Since it is safe to say that corrupt practices have serious 
economic consequences and, hence, that the study of corruption based on reliable data merits careful 
attention, in this section we propose a measure of graft that is based on actual firm encounters with 
dishonest officials. To that end, we take advantage of detailed survey data on approximately 10,000 firms 
in 33 African and Latin American countries to calculate what we call a Graft Index of Firm Transactions 
(GIFT).  The data come from the World Bank Group’s Enterprise Surveys, which collect information on 
whether businesses had to provide a bribe to complete a series of six different transactions: requests for an 
electrical connection, a water connection, telephone service, an import license, a construction-related 
permit, or an operating license. 
3.1  How is the Graft Index of Firm Transactions calculated? 
Formally, the index is defined as the sample probability that a firm in country   will be asked to 
























is the GIFT for country  , where the sub-indices   and   represent firm i  and transaction type  , 
respectively. The binary variable   is equal to 1 if firm   was requested to make an informal payment 
when undertaking transaction type   in country   and   otherwise. The denominator is the sum of all 
transactions of type   in country k  that occurred between the time the survey took place and up to two 
years prior.  




In words, the Graft Index of Firm Transactions is the proportion of instances in which firms were 
either expected or requested to pay a gift or informal payment over the number of total solicitations for 
public services, licenses or permits for that country. We emphasize that the index is based on the 
respondent’s direct experience with corruption. As such, this index does not have the disadvantages that 
are present in perceptions indexes. In addition, the index can be compared across countries. All firms 
  9 across the globe must undertake the transactions listed above at one point or another in the life and 
operation of the business. 
This index can be criticized for being based on the self-reporting of illegal activities. 
Interviewees’ may fear the consequences of answering honestly, especially if they have themselves been 
directly involved in corrupt transactions. However, the questions asked puts the interviewee in the role of 
victim and not promoter of corruption. It would be very different to worry about receiving an honest 
answer when asking about how much and who a firm had to bribe to be granted a lucrative government 
contract than it is when asking the same firm to tell the interviewer if the firm was compelled to provide a 
bribe to get a service or license.  
The index can also be criticized for its narrow focus on the bribery of officials delivering 
infrastructure services and licenses. The index does not measure corruption that may take place in large-
scale business transactions such as favorable deals on government contracts, the granting of government 
licenses or rights of use of public goods to insiders, rigged participation in public tenders, or lax 
enforcement of regulations or terms of government contracts because of a payoff. The index also does not 
measure corruption in situations where an economic transaction is not concerned, such as in the legal 
system where a court is asked to look the other way or to rule in favor of a party that paid a bribe. Lastly, 
the index also does not deal with political corruption; that is corruption associated with manipulated and 
non-transparent elections, the buying of legislative votes, or political nepotism. These kinds of corruption 
may involve both greater amounts of money and represent larger economic distortions than the common, 
petty corruption that our index measures. 
3.2  GIFT estimates 
We estimate the GIFT for all six transactions taken together (Table 2). We also grouped 
transactions into two separate subsets, infrastructure (electricity, water, telephone --- Table 3) and 
licensing (import licenses, construction permits, operating licenses --- Table 4), and estimate the GIFT for 
each subset. Finally, we estimate the GIFT for each transaction separately in each country, but we warn 
that in many instances our confidence intervals become large (Tables A.1 to A.6). In all cases, we 
estimated the standard error of our estimate and its 95-percent confidence interval. In countries with few 
transactions, the confidence intervals can be substantial, making it hard to definitively rank several 
countries.  
We first note that, pooling data from all 33 countries, a total of 9519 requests for licenses or 
infrastructure services were registered in the Enterprise Surveys. Firms reported being asked for bribes in 
933 instances. Thus, on average, firms in these countries are the target of bribery one out of 10 times they 
perform any of the six transactions included in the survey. Nevertheless, the difference in the incidence of 
  10 graft among African and Latin American firms is substantial. The former are subjected to bribery more 
than 19 percent of the time, compared to less than 7 percent among their Latin American peers. In other 
words, African firms are three times as likely to be the victims of corruption relative to firms in Latin 
America.
8
Table 2 reports GIFT estimates for each country taking all transactions together; Figure 1 depicts 
countries ordered from less to more corrupt, according to the point estimate of the graft index. Namibia 
stands out as the least corrupt country in our sample. Out of 166 transactions recorded, no instances of 
requests for bribes were recorded. The 95-percent confidence interval suggests that only as many as 2.7 
percent of all firms would be targeted by corrupt officials in that country. The next four least graft-prone 
countries in our sample are all in Latin America (Uruguay, Chile, Colombia, and El Salvador). The 
probability that a firm is the target of bribes in those countries lies between one and 4.4 percent. At the 
opposite end, the five most corrupt countries in the sample are all in Africa. In the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, the most corrupt country in our sample, a firm will be asked for bribes 53 to 72 percent of the 
time with a 95 percent probability, whereas in Guinea, Cameroon, and Mauritania, more than half of all 
firms will be asked for bribes.  
It is important to keep in mind that our index measures graft imprecisely and, therefore, that one 
cannot simply take the point estimates behind Figure 1 to make statements about whether graft is more 
pronounced in one country than in another. In order to say something about the relative incidence of graft 
between two countries, we calculated whether their corresponding GIFT estimates are statistically 
different. Results appear in Table 5. For example, although Namibia has the lowest estimated incidence of 
corruption, it is statistically as uncorrupt as Uruguay and less corrupt than all other countries. Uruguay, in 
turn, displays the same level of graft as Namibia, but one could not reject the hypothesis that graft in that 
country is the same as in Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Rwanda, Botswana, Argentina, and Panama. 
Rwanda’s GIFT estimate is particularly noisy, given that the number of observed transactions and 
instances of corruption are very low (see Table 2); hence, despite its low GIFT of 0.031, only eight 
countries appear to have unambiguously lower or higher levels of corruption than Rwanda. Some 
differences among neighboring countries are interesting on their own. El Salvador, for instance, is 
significantly less corrupt than Mexico and other countries in Central America — Guatemala, Nicaragua 
and Honduras; the latter, in contrast, is significantly more corrupt than the other four countries. Likewise, 
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  11 in the Andean region, Colombia stands out as less corrupt than the rest, while Paraguay and Ecuador are 
distinctly more corrupt.
9
Among the most graft-prone countries in the sample, Guinea, Cameroon, Mauritania and DR 
Congo are statistically more corrupt than the 29 countries in our sample with lower graft indices. It should 
be noted that Paraguay and Ecuador, the two most corrupt countries in Latin America, appear to be less 
corrupt only when compared to the latter four extreme cases (Guinea, Cameroon, Mauritania, and DR 
Congo), and are equally corrupt, or even more so, than the rest of the African countries in our sample. 
That the index may vary so widely among countries in the same region suggests that corruption is 
unlikely to be explained by historical or cultural traits, but rather by the institutional environment that 
exists in each country. We explore that possibility in the next section. 
We turn now to the incidence of graft by type of transaction; see Tables 3 and 4. Looking at our 
sample as a whole, bribery is more prevalent when soliciting licenses or permits than when requesting 
infrastructure services. The data show that 11.3 percent of firms are asked for bribes in the former case, 
three percentage points more than when requesting electricity, water, or telephone connections; the gap is 
statistically significant at the 95 percent level. Nevertheless, the difference is driven primarily by Latin 
American firms. Whereas in Africa we do not find any statistically significant difference in the incidence 
of graft between licensing or infrastructure transactions, in Latin America obtaining licenses puts firms at 
a higher risk of being asked for bribes, 8.3 percent vs. 5.3 percent relative to requests for infrastructure 
services. On a country by country basis, the probability of being asked for bribes in licensing vis-à-vis 
infrastructure is statistically higher in Argentina, Bolivia, El Salvador, Peru, and DR Congo; the converse 
is only true in Malawi and Niger.  
Three hypotheses come to mind in trying to explain differences in graft incidence across licensing 
and infrastructure. First, a number of countries in the world have privatized the provision of infrastructure 
services, primarily in telecommunications, but also in water and electricity provision. Private providers of 
such services would have greater incentives to setup mechanisms that prevent their employees from 
requesting informal payments from their customers, while perhaps increasing formal fees that would 
accrue to profits. Second, at least in the case of telephony, competition, especially from mobile 
telephones, would appear to be stiffer, which would reduce the ability to extract rents from firms. Third, 
government regulation and red-tape is more common in obtaining licenses and permits and, as we show in 
the following section, excessive regulation creates opportunities for corrupt officials to extract bribes 
from firms. 
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  12 4  What lies behind the incidence of corruption? 
Having estimated measures of the incidence of corruption, in this section we explore some of its 
correlates. We do this by running regressions of the Graft Index of Firm Transactions on a number of 
different regressors, motivated by the existing literature. Specifically, we consider whether firms are more 
likely to fall prey to corrupt officials in overly-regulated economies and in less democratic countries. 
Admittedly, cross-country data make it difficult to identify the causal links between graft and potential 
explanatory variables. With this caveat in mind, our aim is to shed light on some of the factors that are 
believed to be drivers of corruption.  
The existence of burdensome business regulations stands out as a potential driver of graft.
10
  
While some degree of regulation could be justified under the argument that it is required to safeguard the 
public interest, a competing explanation, the tollbooth view (Shleifer and Vishny 1993),  is that 
regulations are put in place in order to extract rents in favor of specific business interests or government 
officials. Djankov et al. (2002) explore such alternative explanations and conclude that, rather than 
protecting the public interest, regulation —in their study, business entry rules— is associated with greater 
levels of corruption. In the same vein, Svensson (2005) presents econometric evidence showing a positive 
link between greater regulation and more corruption. More recently, Olken and Barron (2007) look at 
bribe payments by truck drivers at checkpoints along Indonesian roads and find support for Shleifer and 
Vishny’s (1993) tollbooth hypothesis. Both the study by Djankov et al. (2002) and that of Svensson 
(2005) rely mainly on corruption perception measures which, as we have argued, are only an imperfect 
approximation to actual corrupt practices. Thus, it is worth asking whether regulation might be behind 
corruption when we use our index of the actual incidence of graft.  
Figure 2 shows that there is a clear positive correlation between the incidence of graft and the 
extent and nature of the regulatory and legal obligations that firms face. The latter is obtained from the 
“Ease of Doing Business” indicator in the Doing Business dataset, with a higher measure indicating a less 
benign business environment. The GIFT allows us to delve into the subject. For example, in Figure 3 we 
show that the probability of being the victim of graft when requesting an operating license or a 
construction permit are positively correlated, respectively, with Doing Business measures of restrictions 
on starting a business and problems in dealing with licenses in construction projects.  
Econometric results in Table 6 confirm what we see graphically: excessive regulation is 
associated with more graft even after taking into consideration other factors that may explain the level of 
corruption. The results in column 2 suggest that a one-standard deviation decline in obstacles to doing 
                                                      
10
 See Bardhan (1997) for a discussion. 
  13 business reduces the probability of being the victim of graft by 8 percentage points. Likewise, from 
column 3, reducing constraints in starting a business by one-standard deviation results in a 7.5 percent-
point lower probability that firms will be asked for bribes when requesting an operating license.  Last, the 
likelihood that firms will be hit by graft when requesting construction permits is six percentage points 
lower following a one-standard deviation reduction in the Doing Business “Dealing with licenses” 
measure (column 4). Therefore, our results confirm previous evidence, based on perceptions data, linking 
regulation and corruption, with the added benefit that we are able to focus more narrowly on specific 
regulations and transactions affected by corrupt practices. 
Firms are also more susceptible to graft in countries where the institutional environment is weak 
and, in particular, where the accountability of government officials is limited. In particular, 
democratically-elected governments are more open to public scrutiny and hence are more likely to adopt 
anti-corruption efforts (Bardhan 1997; Treisman 2000; Svensson 2005). We use data from the Polity IV 
Project to study the relationship between democracy and corruption.
11
 Our measure of democracy is based 
on the “polity score,” which provides a measure of competitiveness in the process of executive 
recruitment, constraints on the chief executive, and the competitiveness and regulation of political 
participation. The polity score takes values from -10 to 10, with increases in the score reflecting a more 
democratic political regime.  
As we report in Table 6, firms in democratic countries are less likely to be asked for bribes. In 
column 5, the estimated coefficient for the polity score is negative and significant at the 10 percent level. 
When we include “Ease of doing business” as a measure of regulation (column 6), both the latter and the 
polity coefficient have the expected sign and are significant at the 10 percent level; the hypothesis that 
both of them are jointly equal to zero is rejected at the five-percent level. The fact that both coefficients 
are still statistically significant is of interest. Djankov et al (2002) show that democratic governments are 
less likely to adopt costly regulations. In Table 5 we observe that the estimated coefficient for regulation 
falls when we account for the level of democracy, which is consistent with the evidence in Djankov et al 
(2002). In addition, in our sample, even holding constant the level of democracy, regulation is still 
associated with more graft. Columns 7 and 8 show that the positive association between bureaucratic 
constraints in starting a business or obtaining a construction license, on the one hand, and the incidence of 
graft in obtaining and operating license or construction permits, on the other, remains statistically 
significant. 
In order to put our previous results in perspective, let us consider how much graft in Africa would 
decline if both the levels of democracy and of regulation moved to those that exist in Latin America. 
  14 Countries in the former region are characterized by weaker democracies and more regulation, as well as 
more pervasive graft. Among countries in our sample, the median polity level is -1 in Africa and 8 in 
Latin America. Moreover, the “Ease of doing business” percentile rank is .67 in Africa and .49 in Latin 
America. The estimates in column 6 of Table 6 imply that strengthening democracy and reducing 
regulation from their respective median levels in Africa to those of Latin America would reduce the 
probability that firms are victims of graft by 16.2 percentage points from its average level of 19 percent; 
that is, the incidence of bribery in Africa would fall by 85 percent under this scenario. Thus, our back-of-
the-envelope calculation suggests that fostering democracy and reducing excessive regulation would go a 
long way in improving Africa’s business climate by reducing corruption. 
5  Conclusions 
In this paper we argue that existing measures of corruption around the world are an inaccurate 
gauge of the true incidence of graft on the typical firm. Such measures are often based on surveys of 
experts, of specific types of firms, or of households, which do not necessarily match one-to-one with the 
views held by the typical firm. Moreover, existing indicators are often based on perceptions and not 
necessarily on hard data. Yet, we present evidence showing that average firm perceptions adjust only 
gradually to changes in the business environment. We show that firms that request licenses or 
infrastructure services and are not asked for bribes hold a more sanguine view about the pervasiveness of 
graft, relative not only to firms that did fall prey to corrupt officials but also to firms that did not request 
such services and hence would have not been affected by bribery. Then, for example, if a country were to 
effectively launch an anti-corruption campaign, firms’ views on corruption would change, but only 
gradually, to the improved business climate.  
In order to remedy the shortcomings of existing corruption measures, we introduced an 
experience-based index, the Graft Index of Firm Transactions, which measures the probability that a firm 
will be asked for a bribe in order to complete a specified set of business transactions. We estimated the 
index using data on approximately 10,000 firms from the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys in 33 
countries in Africa and Latin America. Our index has several advantages: It is based on firms’ direct 
encounters with corruption and not on perceptions; it is free of ambiguities as it focuses on a common set 
of business transactions in all countries; and it reflects the incidence of graft on the typical firm of a 
country since it is based on nationally representative data. On the downside, our index focuses on petty 
bribery and does not capture other possible forms of corruption. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
11
 See Marshall and Jaggers (2005). Data and documentation available at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/
  15 The Graft Index of Firm Transactions shows that African firms are three times as likely to be 
victims of bribery than their Latin American counterparts. Within each region, though, there is substantial 
variation. Namibia, along with Uruguay, stands out as the least corrupt country. Paraguay and Ecuador, 
the most corrupt Latin American countries in our sample, lag behind several African countries. 
Corruption is gravest in four African countries — Guinea, Cameroon, Mauritania, and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. In those countries, around one in two firms is the victim of bribery. Our index also 
indicates that bribery is more common when requesting licenses or government permits than when 
requesting infrastructure services such as telephone, water, or electricity connections.  
In order to shed light on the factors that lie behind corruption, we run country-level regressions 
with our graft index as dependent variable. We find a strong correlation between excessive regulation and 
corruption, with a one-standard deviation in the ease of doing business reducing graft by approximately 
one third of a standard deviation. Likewise, democratic governments do a better job in curtailing 
corruption. As a back-of-the-envelope application of these findings, our results imply that bribery in 
Africa would fall by 85 percent if it had levels of democracy and regulation similar to those that exist in 
Latin America, closing the gap in the incidence of graft between the two regions. 
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  18 Tables and Figures 
Table 1 
Perception vs Incidence of Corruption: Probit Regression Results
(Dependent variable: Firm ranked corruption a top three obstacle)
(1) (2) (3)
Latin America Africa Pooled
Employment (log) -0.013 -0.004 -0.011***
(0.004)*** (0.007) (0.004)
Age of establishment 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Omitted category: No service solicited
Solicited service and was asked for bribe 0.014 0.010 0.014
(0.024) (0.026) (0.019)
Solicited service and was not asked for bribe -0.025 -0.037 -0.028
(0.012)** (0.016)** (0.010)***
Observations 6510 1877 8387
Notes:
 Robust standard errors in parentheses
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
  19 Table 2 
Graft Index of Firm Transactions ― All transactions
(Probability that a firm will be asked for bribes when undertaking any of six business transactions)
Country Index Lower bound Upper bound
Namibia 0.000 166 0 0.000 0.000 0.027
Uruguay 0.021 387 8 0.007 0.010 0.041
Chile 0.023 744 17 0.005 0.014 0.037
Colombia 0.023 603 14 0.006 0.014 0.039
El Salvador 0.026 508 13 0.007 0.015 0.044
Rwanda 0.031 32 1 0.031 0.000 0.171
Botswana 0.037 163 6 0.015 0.015 0.080
Argentina 0.042 744 31 0.007 0.029 0.059
Panama 0.045 199 9 0.015 0.023 0.085
Mexico 0.055 490 27 0.010 0.038 0.079
Guatemala 0.064 453 29 0.012 0.045 0.091
Nicaragua 0.071 434 31 0.012 0.050 0.100
Bolivia 0.072 498 36 0.012 0.052 0.099
Peru 0.087 494 43 0.013 0.065 0.115
Venezuela 0.090 156 14 0.023 0.053 0.146
Burundi 0.098 61 6 0.038 0.042 0.202
Uganda 0.103 340 35 0.016 0.075 0.140
Burkina Faso 0.109 46 5 0.046 0.043 0.235
Malawi 0.120 275 33 0.020 0.086 0.164
Honduras 0.121 390 47 0.016 0.092 0.157
Angola 0.127 189 24 0.024 0.086 0.183
Swaziland 0.143 70 10 0.042 0.078 0.245
Paraguay 0.143 370 53 0.018 0.111 0.183
Cape Verde 0.152 33 5 0.062 0.062 0.314
Guinea-Bissau 0.154 78 12 0.041 0.089 0.251
Ecuador 0.159 666 106 0.014 0.133 0.189
Tanzania 0.167 233 39 0.024 0.125 0.221
Gambia 0.183 60 11 0.050 0.104 0.301
Niger 0.201 179 36 0.030 0.149 0.266
Guinea 0.454 108 49 0.048 0.363 0.548
Cameroon 0.466 176 82 0.038 0.394 0.540
Mauritania 0.514 74 38 0.058 0.402 0.624
Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.630 100 63 0.048 0.532 0.718
Notes:
Information about requests for water connections was not collected in Venezuela.
Standard errors and confidence intervals were calculated pooling all data togethere and assuming that the 








  20 Table 3 
Graft Index of Firm Transactions ― Infrastructure services
(Probability that a firm will be asked for bribes when requesting electricity, water or telephone connections)
Country Index Lower bound Upper bound
Namibia 0.000 84 0 0.000 0.000 0.052
El Salvador 0.007 274 2 0.005 0.000 0.028
Bolivia 0.008 243 2 0.006 0.000 0.031
Uruguay 0.015 197 3 0.009 0.003 0.046
Chile 0.017 404 7 0.006 0.008 0.036
Argentina 0.022 461 10 0.007 0.011 0.040
Colombia 0.025 363 9 0.008 0.012 0.047
Panama 0.035 115 4 0.017 0.011 0.089
Peru 0.035 254 9 0.012 0.018 0.067
Botswana 0.036 56 2 0.025 0.003 0.128
Mexico 0.049 366 18 0.011 0.031 0.077
Guatemala 0.060 248 15 0.015 0.036 0.098
Swaziland 0.067 30 2 0.046 0.008 0.224
Burundi 0.067 30 2 0.046 0.008 0.224
Nicaragua 0.077 221 17 0.018 0.048 0.120
Venezuela 0.082 85 7 0.030 0.038 0.163
Uganda 0.101 89 9 0.032 0.052 0.183
Angola 0.122 90 11 0.035 0.068 0.207
Honduras 0.146 144 21 0.029 0.097 0.213
Guinea-Bissau 0.152 33 5 0.062 0.062 0.314
Burkina Faso 0.154 26 4 0.071 0.055 0.341
Cape Verde 0.154 13 2 0.100 0.031 0.435
Paraguay 0.158 171 27 0.028 0.110 0.220
Malawi 0.161 143 23 0.031 0.109 0.230
Tanzania 0.170 100 17 0.038 0.108 0.256
Ecuador 0.192 271 52 0.024 0.149 0.243
Gambia 0.238 21 5 0.093 0.102 0.455
Niger 0.309 68 21 0.056 0.211 0.427
Guinea 0.462 65 30 0.062 0.346 0.581
Cameroon 0.475 40 19 0.079 0.329 0.625
Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.484 31 15 0.090 0.320 0.652
Mauritania 0.569 51 29 0.069 0.433 0.695
Notes:
Information about requests for water connections was not collected in Venezuela.
Standard errors and confidence intervals were calculated pooling all data togethere and assuming that the 









  21 Graft Index of Firm Transactions ― Licensing
(Probability that a firm will be asked for bribes when soliciting import, operating or construction licenses)
Country Index Lower bound Upper bound
Namibia 0.000 82 0 0.000 0.000 0.054
Colombia 0.021 240 5 0.009 0.008 0.049
Uruguay 0.026 190 5 0.012 0.010 0.062
Chile 0.029 340 10 0.009 0.015 0.054
Rwanda 0.034 29 1 0.034 0.000 0.186
Botswana 0.037 107 4 0.018 0.012 0.095
El Salvador 0.047 234 11 0.014 0.026 0.083




































0.060 84 5 0.026 0.022 0.135
a 0.066 213 14 0.017 0.039 0.108
ala 0.068 205 14 0.018 0.040 0.112
0.073 124 9 0.023 0.037 0.134
a 0.074 283 21 0.016 0.049 0.111
0.076 132 10 0.023 0.040 0.135
a 0.099 71 7 0.035 0.046 0.193
0.104 251 26 0.019 0.071 0.148
s 0.106 246 26 0.020 0.073 0.151
0.129 31 4 0.060 0.045 0.295
0.131 199 26 0.024 0.090 0.185
0.131 99 13 0.034 0.077 0.213
0.133 255 34 0.021 0.097 0.181
0.135 111 15 0.032 0.083 0.212
0.137 395 54 0.017 0.106 0.174
0.142 240 34 0.023 0.103 0.192
0.150 20 3 0.080 0.044 0.369
0.154 39 6 0.058 0.069 0.301
sau 0.156 45 7 0.054 0.074 0.291
0.165 133 22 0.032 0.111 0.238
nd 0.200 40 8 0.063 0.102 0.350
0.391 23 9 0.102 0.221 0.593
0.442 43 19 0.076 0.304 0.589
0.463 136 63 0.043 0.382 0.547
em. Rep. 0.696 69 48 0.055 0.579 0.792
rd errors and confidence intervals were calculated pooling all data togethere and assuming that the 
t for bribes follows a binomial distribution.  


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix Table A.1 
Graft Index of Firm Transactions ― Electrical Connections
(Probability that a firm will be asked for bribes when requesting an electrical connection)
Country Index Lower bound Upper bound
Namibia 0.000 26 0 0.000 0.000 0.152
Venezuela 0.000 28 0 0.000 0.000 0.143
Botswana 0.000 14 0 0.000 0.000 0.251
Peru 0.011 89 1 0.011 0.000 0.067
Chile 0.014 141 2 0.010 0.001 0.053
El Salvador 0.019 104 2 0.013 0.001 0.072
Bolivia 0.023 86 2 0.016 0.001 0.086
Argentina 0.034 177 6 0.014 0.014 0.074
Colombia 0.035 114 4 0.017 0.011 0.090
Mexico 0.036 137 5 0.016 0.013 0.085
Uruguay 0.040 75 3 0.023 0.009 0.116
Panama 0.044 45 2 0.031 0.004 0.156
Burundi 0.063 16 1 0.061 0.000 0.303
Nicaragua 0.067 89 6 0.027 0.028 0.142
Guatemala 0.076 105 8 0.026 0.037 0.145
Angola 0.104 48 5 0.044 0.041 0.226
Swaziland 0.125 8 1 0.117 0.001 0.492
Burkina Faso 0.125 8 1 0.117 0.001 0.492
Paraguay 0.129 62 8 0.043 0.064 0.237
Guinea-Bissau 0.133 15 2 0.088 0.025 0.391
Uganda 0.140 43 6 0.053 0.062 0.276
Honduras 0.164 55 9 0.050 0.086 0.285
Ecuador 0.165 103 17 0.037 0.105 0.249
Malawi 0.182 44 8 0.058 0.092 0.322
Niger 0.208 24 5 0.083 0.088 0.409
Tanzania 0.243 37 9 0.071 0.132 0.403
Cape Verde 0.250 4 1 0.217 0.034 0.711
Gambia 0.286 7 2 0.171 0.076 0.648
Cameroon 0.417 12 5 0.142 0.193 0.681
Guinea 0.529 34 18 0.086 0.367 0.686
Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.615 13 8 0.135 0.354 0.824
Mauritania 0.667 15 10 0.122 0.415 0.850
Rwanda 0
Notes:
Standard errors and confidence intervals were calculated pooling all data togethere and assuming that the 









  26 Appendix Table A.2 
Graft Index of Firm Transactions ― Water Connections
(Probability that a firm will be asked for bribes when requesting a water connection)
Country Index Lower bound Upper bound
Uruguay 0.000 27 0 0.000 0.000 0.148
Bolivia 0.000 25 0 0.000 0.000 0.158
Botswana 0.000 11 0 0.000 0.000 0.300
Swaziland 0.000 5 0 0.000 0.000 0.489
Chile 0.000 26 0 0.000 0.000 0.152
El Salvador 0.000 24 0 0.000 0.000 0.163
Namibia 0.000 16 0 0.000 0.000 0.227
Argentina 0.026 39 1 0.025 0.000 0.144
Nicaragua 0.029 34 1 0.029 0.000 0.162
Colombia 0.043 23 1 0.043 0.000 0.227
Honduras 0.056 18 1 0.054 0.000 0.276
Uganda 0.056 18 1 0.054 0.000 0.276
Paraguay 0.080 25 2 0.054 0.011 0.261
Guinea-Bissau 0.083 12 1 0.080 0.000 0.375
Panama 0.083 12 1 0.080 0.000 0.375
Guatemala 0.130 46 6 0.050 0.057 0.260
Angola 0.130 23 3 0.070 0.037 0.330
Mexico 0.161 31 5 0.066 0.066 0.331
Tanzania 0.167 24 4 0.076 0.061 0.365
Burkina Faso 0.167 6 1 0.152 0.011 0.582
Ecuador 0.171 35 6 0.064 0.077 0.331
Gambia 0.200 5 1 0.179 0.020 0.640
Peru 0.222 27 6 0.080 0.103 0.411
Malawi 0.263 19 5 0.101 0.115 0.491
Niger 0.286 14 4 0.121 0.113 0.550
Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.375 8 3 0.171 0.135 0.696
Guinea 0.391 23 9 0.102 0.221 0.593
Cape Verde 0.500 2 1 0.354 0.095 0.905
Cameroon 0.500 8 4 0.177 0.215 0.785





Information about requests for water connections was not collected in Venezuela.
Standard errors and confidence intervals were calculated pooling all data togethere and assuming that the 









  27 Appendix Table A.3 
Graft Index of Firm Transactions ― Telephone Connections
(Probability that a firm will be asked for bribes when requesting a telephone connection)
Country Index Lower bound Upper bound
El Salvador 0.000 146 0 0.000 0.000 0.031
Rwanda 0.000 3 0 0.000 0.000 0.617
Cape Verde 0.000 7 0 0.000 0.000 0.404
Bolivia 0.000 132 0 0.000 0.000 0.034
Namibia 0.000 42 0 0.000 0.000 0.100
Uruguay 0.000 95 0 0.000 0.000 0.047
Guatemala 0.010 97 1 0.010 0.000 0.062
Argentina 0.012 245 3 0.007 0.002 0.037
Peru 0.014 138 2 0.010 0.001 0.055
Panama 0.017 58 1 0.017 0.000 0.100
Colombia 0.018 226 4 0.009 0.005 0.046
Chile 0.021 237 5 0.009 0.008 0.050
Mexico 0.040 198 8 0.014 0.019 0.079
Swaziland 0.059 17 1 0.057 0.000 0.289
Botswana 0.065 31 2 0.044 0.008 0.217
Uganda 0.071 28 2 0.049 0.009 0.237
Burundi 0.071 14 1 0.069 0.000 0.335
Nicaragua 0.102 98 10 0.031 0.055 0.179
Tanzania 0.103 39 4 0.049 0.035 0.242
Venezuela 0.123 57 7 0.043 0.058 0.236
Malawi 0.125 80 10 0.037 0.067 0.217
Honduras 0.155 71 11 0.043 0.087 0.258
Angola 0.158 19 3 0.084 0.047 0.384
Burkina Faso 0.167 12 2 0.108 0.035 0.460
Paraguay 0.202 84 17 0.044 0.129 0.301
Ecuador 0.218 133 29 0.036 0.156 0.296
Gambia 0.222 9 2 0.139 0.053 0.557
Guinea-Bissau 0.333 6 2 0.192 0.093 0.704
Guinea 0.375 8 3 0.171 0.135 0.696
Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.400 10 4 0.155 0.167 0.688
Niger 0.400 30 12 0.089 0.246 0.577
Mauritania 0.417 24 10 0.101 0.244 0.612
Cameroon 0.500 20 10 0.112 0.299 0.701
Notes:
Standard errors and confidence intervals were calculated pooling all data togethere and assuming that the 









  28 Appendix Table A.4 
Graft Index of Firm Transactions ― Construction Permits
(Probability that a firm will be asked for bribes when requesting a construction permit)
Country Index Lower bound Upper bound
Namibia 0.000 21 0 0.000 0.000 0.182
Uruguay 0.000 70 0 0.000 0.000 0.062
Swaziland 0.000 5 0 0.000 0.000 0.489
Burkina Faso 0.000 4 0 0.000 0.000 0.546
Colombia 0.000 41 0 0.000 0.000 0.102
Chile 0.037 136 5 0.016 0.014 0.085
Guinea-Bissau 0.071 14 1 0.069 0.000 0.335
Venezuela 0.091 11 1 0.087 0.000 0.399
Botswana 0.100 10 1 0.095 0.000 0.426
El Salvador 0.103 58 6 0.040 0.045 0.211
Argentina 0.106 132 14 0.027 0.063 0.171
Mexico 0.108 37 4 0.051 0.037 0.253
Panama 0.118 34 4 0.055 0.041 0.272
Nicaragua 0.119 42 5 0.050 0.047 0.255
Cape Verde 0.125 8 1 0.117 0.001 0.492
Guatemala 0.136 59 8 0.045 0.068 0.248
Ecuador 0.167 60 10 0.048 0.091 0.282
Honduras 0.175 40 7 0.060 0.084 0.323
Uganda 0.188 16 3 0.098 0.058 0.438
Angola 0.190 21 4 0.086 0.071 0.406
Peru 0.195 87 17 0.043 0.125 0.292
Malawi 0.200 35 7 0.068 0.097 0.362
Paraguay 0.213 75 16 0.047 0.135 0.320
Bolivia 0.222 63 14 0.052 0.136 0.340
Rwanda 0.250 4 1 0.217 0.034 0.711
Gambia 0.286 7 2 0.171 0.076 0.648
Tanzania 0.364 22 8 0.103 0.196 0.571
Niger 0.389 18 7 0.115 0.202 0.615
Cameroon 0.429 7 3 0.187 0.158 0.750
Guinea 0.556 9 5 0.166 0.266 0.812
Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.625 8 5 0.171 0.304 0.865
Mauritania 0.700 10 7 0.145 0.392 0.897
Burundi 1.000 1 1 0.000 0.167 1.000
Notes:
Standard errors and confidence intervals were calculated pooling all data togethere and assuming that the 
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Graft Index of Firm Transactions ― Import Licenses
(Probability that a firm will be asked for bribes when requesting an import license)
Country Index Lower bound Upper bound
Rwanda 0.000 11 0 0.000 0.000 0.300
Namibia 0.000 22 0 0.000 0.000 0.175
Malawi 0.000 36 0 0.000 0.000 0.115
Guinea-Bissau 0.000 4 0 0.000 0.000 0.546
Botswana 0.000 19 0 0.000 0.000 0.198
Colombia 0.009 117 1 0.009 0.000 0.052
Guatemala 0.009 113 1 0.009 0.000 0.053
Chile 0.013 75 1 0.013 0.000 0.079
Mexico 0.019 52 1 0.019 0.000 0.111
El Salvador 0.021 94 2 0.015 0.001 0.079
Peru 0.031 32 1 0.031 0.000 0.171
Uruguay 0.034 87 3 0.020 0.008 0.101
Argentina 0.041 98 4 0.020 0.013 0.104
Panama 0.042 24 1 0.041 0.000 0.219
Venezuela 0.045 22 1 0.044 0.000 0.235
Burundi 0.050 20 1 0.049 0.000 0.254
Nicaragua 0.051 59 3 0.029 0.012 0.145
Bolivia 0.070 71 5 0.030 0.027 0.158
Niger 0.083 60 5 0.036 0.032 0.185
Burkina Faso 0.091 11 1 0.087 0.000 0.399
Uganda 0.097 31 3 0.053 0.026 0.257
Paraguay 0.098 92 9 0.031 0.050 0.178
Ecuador 0.111 199 22 0.022 0.074 0.162
Mauritania 0.111 9 1 0.105 0.000 0.457
Tanzania 0.125 32 4 0.058 0.044 0.287
Honduras 0.133 45 6 0.051 0.059 0.266
Angola 0.176 17 3 0.092 0.054 0.418
Gambia 0.200 10 2 0.126 0.046 0.521
Swaziland 0.231 13 3 0.117 0.075 0.509
Cape Verde 0.286 7 2 0.171 0.076 0.648
Guinea 0.286 7 2 0.171 0.076 0.648
Cameroon 0.459 37 17 0.082 0.310 0.616
Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.846 13 11 0.100 0.565 0.969
Notes:
Standard errors and confidence intervals were calculated pooling all data togethere and assuming that the 
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Graft Index of Firm Transactions ― Operating Licenses
(Probability that a firm will be asked for bribes when requesting an operating license)
Country Index Lower bound Upper bound
Cape Verde 0.000 5 0 0.000 0.000 0.489
Namibia 0.000 39 0 0.000 0.000 0.107
Panama 0.000 26 0 0.000 0.000 0.152
Burkina Faso 0.000 5 0 0.000 0.000 0.489
Rwanda 0.000 14 0 0.000 0.000 0.251
Chile 0.031 129 4 0.015 0.009 0.080
Paraguay 0.031 32 1 0.031 0.000 0.171
El Salvador 0.037 82 3 0.021 0.008 0.106
Botswana 0.038 78 3 0.022 0.009 0.112
Colombia 0.049 82 4 0.024 0.015 0.123
Malawi 0.049 61 3 0.028 0.011 0.140
Nicaragua 0.054 112 6 0.021 0.022 0.114
Argentina 0.057 53 3 0.032 0.013 0.160
Uruguay 0.061 33 2 0.042 0.007 0.206
Honduras 0.081 161 13 0.021 0.047 0.134
Niger 0.091 33 3 0.050 0.024 0.243
Gambia 0.091 22 2 0.061 0.013 0.290
Uganda 0.098 204 20 0.021 0.064 0.147
Angola 0.098 61 6 0.038 0.042 0.202
Mexico 0.114 35 4 0.054 0.039 0.265
Bolivia 0.124 121 15 0.030 0.075 0.196
Tanzania 0.127 79 10 0.037 0.068 0.219
Venezuela 0.132 38 5 0.055 0.053 0.278
Peru 0.132 121 16 0.031 0.082 0.205
Guatemala 0.152 33 5 0.062 0.062 0.314
Ecuador 0.162 136 22 0.032 0.109 0.233
Burundi 0.200 10 2 0.126 0.046 0.521
Guinea-Bissau 0.222 27 6 0.080 0.103 0.411
Swaziland 0.227 22 5 0.089 0.097 0.439
Mauritania 0.250 4 1 0.217 0.034 0.711
Guinea 0.444 27 12 0.096 0.276 0.627
Cameroon 0.467 92 43 0.052 0.369 0.569
Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.667 48 32 0.068 0.525 0.784
Notes:
Standard errors and confidence intervals were calculated pooling all data togethere and assuming that the 
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SOURCE: Authors calculation based on World Bank's Enterprise Surveys data.
Probability that a firm will be asked for bribes when undertaking any of six transactions
 
Graft Index of Firm Transactions (GIFT)
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SOURCE: Authors calculation based on Doing Business 2007 and Enterprise Surveys.
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SOURCE: Authors calculation based on Doing Business 2007 and Enterprise Surveys.
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